Interim CEO / Chairman also Offering Temporary, Transitional, Turnaround, Crisis, Project, Corporate Restructuring, Subprime, Workout and Expert Witness Services

Chief Executive and Financial Workout Management Services Including Resolving Banking, Mortgage Banking, Subprime Mortgage, Foreclosure Marketing, and Other Loan Issues

Proven Professional Interim Management Services Available on Flexible Terms Worldwide on Short Notice

(Don't miss the article below on subprime mortgage loans and Don Coker's subprime mortgage loan expert witness services, and expert witness services in other areas of finance, banking, mortgage banking, business valuation, I.P. valuation, and business in general.)

Managing Troubled and Failed Banks for Maximum Advantage

By Don Coker, Banking, Management, Valuation, Economic & Real Estate Consultant and Expert Witness

And, we're back!

Remember the banking meltdown of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s? Here we are twenty years later, except that this time, the vexing problem is single-family residential financing instead of commercial real estate financing.

Institutional Management Considerations

When a financial institution encounters a high volume of problems with a particular loan type or with their entire portfolio, then the institution has to be managed in a highly specialized way in order to address the unique problems with the portfolio. It is not logical to expect that the management that brought the financial institution to its present troubled condition will have the objectivity and the ability to shift gears and properly manage the financial institution and its problems in a manner that will allow it to survive. This is when an experienced interim financial institution manager must be brought in.

Identifying Desirable and Undesirable Assets and Nonperforming Loans

From the first day, the interim manager must undertake the matter of getting a handle on the quality of the assets and nonperforming loans contained in the various segments of the financial institution's asset portfolio. For example, today many institutions have decent quality loans to consumers, businesses, and perhaps also to commercial real estate owners, but have clearly recognizable problems in their single-family, construction, and acquisition and development loan portfolios. The nature and severity of these problems must be estimated, and a plan established and implemented to capitalize on the institution's strengths and to mitigate and shore up its weaknesses.

As one small example that often works, it is sometimes desirable to rent out REO and OREO rather than let them sit, incur tax, insurance, and maintenance expenses, and physically deteriorate without producing any financial return at all. And sometimes, the residential renters turn into purchasers down the line. I have successfully implemented the same renting practice for commercial properties as well. It depends on the circumstances.

A realistic net present value analysis is useful in making these decisions.

Identifying Who is a Part of the Problem

Another decision area that has to be addressed beginning the first day on the job is the matter of which personnel stay and leave. These decisions have to be made regardless of the intended future of the institution. Even if the assets of the institution are to be sold off and the institution closed, people who are a part of the problem will be a hindrance in managing the institution and the assets and getting things cleaned up to the point that the assets can be sold. And if the entire institution is to be sold or merged, stripping out the problem personnel beforehand will help facilitate the sale since a purchaser will certainly bring in its own management team that understands the purchaser's goals and systems.

"Live or Die" Decision

At some point, a decision has to be made as to whether the institution can be salvaged. Keep in mind that in light of the Bear Stearns bailout, Fannie Mae bailout, Freddie Mac bailout, AIG bailout, $700 billion subprime loan bailout, GM bailout, Chrysler bailout, and who-knows-what-else-bailouts, it is unlikely that any federal funds will be available to fund a bailout of an institution today. This means that the bank has to be reconstituted into a functioning and workable institution by making prudent adjustments to the present assets and liabilities as well as to assets and liabilities that are added during the reconstitution period.

This does not mean that a new alchemistic accounting trick has to be developed and applied, but rather that Adam Smith-style supply-and-demand and return-on-investment principles need to be reintroduced into the system. How much income will this asset produce over its likely life? What value does this asset's anticipated income stream and residual value have to a likely purchaser? Where are the funds going to come from to purchase this investment?

Regulatory Interface

In addition to all of the aforementioned mountainous jobs, the financial institution's interim manager must interact with the various regulators that have an interest in the bank's welfare. This is no small item since it is common for an institution to be operating under a Cease & Desist Order issued by the banking regulators and specifying various items that the institution must address by certain dates. These items might include an assessment of the bank's staffing and management, maintenance of Tier I capital, reduction of delinquencies, write-offs, creation of a business plan, creation of a plan to reduce exposure to certain problem loans, creation of an ethics policy, etc.

Summary

Managing a troubled or failed financial institution is a tough and lonely job not recommended for the inexperienced, weak or timid. It requires immense experience, imagination, credibility, a sense of strategy, ethics, and a personality that is oriented toward action.

About the Author

Don Coker is a heavily experienced financial institution management professional and former high-level governmental banking regulator who was previously chosen by the banking regulators to serve as an interim manager and in regulatory oversight positions. Based upon extensive experience and achievements in banking and lending at Citicorp and entities that are now Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Regions Financial, he was chosen to serve as the on-site supervisory regulatory agent interim manager for two insolvent financial institutions and two bank-owned mortgage banking institutions. Duties included the hands-on management of $1.8 billion (2008 USD) in assets including hundreds of millions of dollars in troubled assets including over 100 commercial real estate properties, and participation in the review and recommendation of various recapitalization, restructuring, and merger plans. Mr. Coker also was called upon by the governmental banking regulators to serve in regulatory oversight positions for various insolvent institutions under the supervision of the banking regulators. In addition, Mr. Coker has been called on numerous times by the governmental banking regulators as well as the IRS to serve as their expert witness consultant in various banking litigation matters totaling over $21 billion.

Mr. Coker is active in litigation consulting, serving as an expert witness consultant in over 400 cases since 1989, and has testified over 100 times, and achieved 12 courthouse settlements. He has been engaged by hundreds of law firms including 33 of the country's top 250. In addition, he has been engaged by 8 of the country's top 10 banks, 8 of the country's top 10 mortgage banking companies, and 12 of the world's largest 45 banks.

In addition to litigation-related work, Mr. Coker is active in performing business valuations, IP valuations, core deposit valuations, feasibility studies, marketing studies, business plans, anti-money laundering consulting, policy and procedure manual consulting, and advising investment funds on banking and investment matters.

Mr. Coker's work has involved clients in 27 countries and work covering 56 countries. He serves clients worldwide from his office in the northern metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia USA area, and can be reached at Bankexpert@cs.com or at (770) 852-2286.

Interim and Temporary Management Situations

By Don Coker, Banking, Management, Valuation, Economic & Real Estate Consultant and Expert Witness also offering Interim Management Services

Interim CEO, Interim Chairman, Interim Manager, Interim Turnaround Manager, Interim Project Manager, Interim Crisis Manager, Interim Restructuring Manager, and Interim Financial Workout Manager Services

Interim CEO, Interim Chairman, Interim Management, Turnaround Management, Project Management, Crisis Management, Restructuring Management, and Financial Workout situations are often the most challenging management jobs in the entire realm of business. In many cases, these situations deal with problems that have confounded previous managers. In other situations, the need for an interim manager may arise due to the departure of a manager, for whatever reason. Still other interim management situations arise due to the need for specialized management skills that do not presently exist within the company. In all of these situations, an interim manager is the solution.

These specialized Interim and Turnaround Management situations often arise due to problems that have already been encountered within an organization, and an experienced professional manager is required in order to manage the company through the problems and return it to a more normal operating mode. Providing effective management in the face of serious problems is quite different than a normal management job. The presence of problems impacts every aspect of management, and a typical manager who may perform well in a normal management environment is not equipped to deal with this unprecedented situation.

Interim Management situations may or may not involve extant problems but definitely involve being thrown into a management situation on short notice and for a short or indefinite tenure. The presence of an Interim Manager always creates apprehension on the part of most, if not all, employees which makes the management job even more difficult.

The goal of an interim management engagement may be to guide the organization toward a specific goal, or it may be to actually determine the goals that need to be achieved and then start working toward their achievement through restructuring and repositioning.

Crisis Management is interim management but usually for a shorter term and for the purpose of dealing with a specific unexpected event, often catastrophic. Quite often, a corporation's response to a true crisis is driven by public relations personnel and lawyers, both of which are ill equipped to deal with the management aspects of such a task. What usually is missing is a clear and unbiased view from a knowledgeable and experienced interim management professional outside the corporation who understands what must be done to address the situation at hand so that the bleeding is stopped and the healing can begin. In these situations, a Crisis Manager can either take over management responsibility on an interim basis or else provide valuable advice and assistance to existing management.

There is no formula for establishing a successful Turnaround, Interim, or Crisis Management program since each one is very different. All that can be said about the Turnaround, Interim, or Crisis Management process in general is that in the macro sense, it follows the pattern that applies to virtually all management situations:

You begin with an idea of the desirable acceptable goals.
You make an assessment of where you are.
You formulate a plan for reaching your goals.
You implement and execute your plan.

In that simplistic regard, Turnaround Management, Interim Management, and Crisis Management sound like regular old everyday management, but they indeed are not. They involve a whole set of problems about which managers in normal situations only have nightmares.

For example, consider each of the four steps just listed:

What are acceptable goals if you have a corporation that is in such bad financial shape that it mathematically could not possibly pull out of the hole it has worked itself into?
How can you accurately assess where you are if your reports and employees think that you are interested in slashing their jobs?
Given the failure of the company in general and the employees and officers to achieve acceptable results in the past, how can their skills be relied upon to reach a new set of goals?
Similarly to the previous problem, even if the employees and officers do possess some skills, how can you expect to effectively implement and execute a plan for recovery if the organization and its officers and employees have a past record of failing to use their job skills to achieve positive results?

These are but a few of the unique and complex problems that make a Turnaround, Interim, or Crisis Management situation one that calls for special management talents.

Think about the incredible set of skills that a Turnaround Manager, Interim Manager, or Crisis Manager must possess in order to be successful:

Solid management skills that include not just routine management experience but also proven abilities to plan, manage and lead successfully in a turbulent situation.
Vision that encompasses the various interests of stockholders, management, employees, creditors, and possibly regulators.
Analytical skills and deep experience to quickly size-up problems, face them, and extinguish them.
Analytical skills to quickly determine what changes need to be made in the organization.
Diplomatic skills to obtain the cooperation of management, employees, creditors, stockholders, and possibly regulators and others needed to implement change strategies.
Personal character, ethics, integrity, discipline, charisma, initiative, and courage to act as "an army of one" when necessary to implement needed changes.
Availability to begin the job on extremely short notice, provide the management services onsite, and serve for a flexible but possibly an usually short period of time.

. . .

Don Coker possesses these characteristics and is willing to discuss your Turnaround Management, Interim Management, Transitional Management, Project Management, Restructuring Management, Workout Management, Crisis Management, or expert witness needs in the strictest confidence.

Mr. Coker has an established record as a highly respected management and financial professional. With management and corporate financing experience and training at such prestigious institutions as Citicorp, Ford Motor Credit, entities that are now Bank One/JPMorgan Chase Bank, Citigroup, Bank of America, and AmSouth/Regions Financial, as well as a governmental financial institution regulatory agency, Don Coker possesses a truly unique background that provides a strong foundation for the mastery of any management task, no matter how difficult.

His wide experiences in business valuation, corporate finance, and management provide him with a unique position to see how organizational changes can translate into improvements in cash flow and increased corporate value.

Mr. Coker has extensive successful experience restructuring various types of troubled debts. These experiences include commercial real estate properties, corporate financing, and entire portfolios of various types. Mr. Coker is knowledgeable in all types of subprime loans.

Mr. Coker is a nationwide court-recognized expert in finance, management, operating policies & procedures, banking practices, and business valuation, having been engaged by numerous major law firms to assist them as an expert witness consultant in over 400 cases nationwide. He has testified over 100 times nationwide as an expert in banking, business, valuation, financial, management, regulatory, and related matters. Mr. Coker is honored to have been hired by 33 of the top 250 law firms in the country, 8 of the country's top 10 banks, and over 60 banks worldwide including 12 of the world's 45 largest banks. Mr. Coker holds the highly unusual distinction of being included in the databases of recommended expert witness consultants of BOTH the DRI and the AAJ.

Mr. Coker is extremely knowledgeable in all aspects of finance including corporate lending, mortgage lending, mortgage banking, subprime mortgage lending, subprime credit card lending, commercial real estate lending, and virtually all other areas of corporate finance.

In every position that he has held in his 40-year career, Mr. Coker has instituted significant improvements in operations, efficiency and profitability. These unusual abilities were of particular importance during a period in the late-1980s Texas banking meltdown when Mr. Coker was tapped by the governmental financial institution regulators as a consultant to simultaneously run two insolvent Texas financial institutions (each with its own mortgage banking company) managing a total of 300 employees at 22 locations in ten states coast-to-coast, with $1.8 billion in gross assets (in 2008 dollars), one third of which were foreclosed or in default, numerous loan participations, and multiple layers of governmental regulatory considerations.

One particularly troubling asset was a 436-unit apartment development in Texas foreclosed while in the slab stage. An analysis of the property revealed that the slabs could not just sit there until the economy improved due to the fact that erosion was undermining the integrity of the slabs. Adding grass around the slabs to stop the erosion meant also adding a sprinkler system. Adding a sprinkler system would mean cutting grass. All told, the cost of letting the slabs sit amounted to over $200,000 per year (2008 dollars).

After Mr. Coker performed a careful market feasibility analysis of the area, it was determined that even though the apartment market was extremely soft in the Dallas Metro area, an apartment development in this particular spot would have a high likelihood of success, and that finishing out the development would be an economically superior alternative to spending $200,000 per year to preserve the slabs.

A development joint venture was negotiated with the Trammell Crow Company, approved by all parties including the federal and state banking regulators, who agreed to make an additional equity contribution of $24.2 million (in 2008 dollars) - their largest nationwide as of that time - and the development was completed, successfully marketed, and profitably sold.

The operations at both Coker-managed financial institutions were improved to the point that one institution was merged into Wells Fargo (then Norwest), and the other was partially sold off on Wall Street and the rest favorably liquidated.

Governmental financial institution regulators and others considered the overall outcomes at both troubled financial institutions to be extremely favorable under the unfortunate circumstances.

In addition to his extensive experience with financial institutions, Mr. Coker also has significant experience with all other types of businesses through his role as a corporate lender and as a highly-respected management consultant. Also in his corporate lending capacity, Mr. Coker has a great deal of positive experience with turnaround and workout situations that stem from troubled loans made by others. His skills and experiences are transferable and useful in any challenging management situation.

Engagements in any industry and any domestic or international geographical location will be considered.

A Primer on Subprime Mortgage Loans, Subprime Lenders, Alt-A Mortgage Loans, Alt-A Lenders, Subprime Credit Cards and Subprime Car Loans

By Don Coker, Banking, Management, Valuation, Economic & Real Estate Consultant and Expert Witness

Subprime Mortgages

It is universally desirable to own a home. Homeownership is the financial foundation of the economy, and the personal financial foundation of most people.

Several years ago, in order to increase the level of homeownership in the country, mortgage lenders began making mortgage loans to borrowers who had less than perfect credit histories or who were new to the credit market. Because of the increased risk present in these loans, they have been referred to as subprime mortgage loans.

Subprime mortgage loans refer to mortgage loans made to borrowers who have a less than prime credit condition. This less than prime credit condition may be due to a history of past credit or financial problems or simply be reflective of the fact that a person may be new to the world of credit and not have established a credit history.

Borrowers with credit scores of 600 and below (650 and below, by some definitions) often will find a subprime mortgage as their only source of mortgage financing. Late payment of bills or declaring bankruptcy could very well place borrowers in a situation where they can only qualify for a subprime mortgage. Accordingly, it is often advisable for people with low credit scores or temporary credit problems to wait for a period of time and build up their credit scores before applying for a mortgage in order to insure they are eligible for a conventional mortgage.

There are other factors that may cause a borrower to fall into the subprime category. For example, some borrowers might be classified as subprime despite having an excellent credit history because they choose not to provide the lender with the opportunity to verify their income or assets stated in the loan application process. Loans of this type are called "stated income" loans or "stated asset" (SISA) loans or "no income-no asset" (NINA) loans. Due to a subprime lender's perceived higher risk in making these types of loans, the borrower is considered a subprime credit.

Subprime lenders generally regard subprime lending as a "numbers game" where they have to go through many prospective borrower applications in order to weed-out unacceptable risks and determine which applicants represent an acceptable level of risk. In order to deal with the large number of applications, subprime lenders often will use a credit scoring system to determine which applicants are acceptable risks and for which loan programs they may qualify.
In addition to using credit scoring programs to help them sort out the many applications that they receive for subprime loans, subprime lenders often make extensive use of television and Internet advertising to help bring in subprime loan applications.

Also, subprime lenders buy lists of potential subprime borrowers and solicit their business by mail or over the Internet.

The reason that subprime lenders go to the trouble of examining large numbers of applications and determining which ones represent acceptable levels of risk is that subprime lenders charge higher interest rates and fees than those charged for non-subprime mortgage loans.

Subprime mortgage loans tend to have a shorter time horizon and fewer opportunities to refinance when interest rates fall than do traditional non-subprime loans.

As of the first half of 2007, approximately 25% of mortgage originations in the United States were classified as subprime.

As of 3Q 2008, 1.35 million homes in the United States were in foreclosure; and 6.99% of all mortgage loans in the country were delinquent, according to the Motrgage Bankers Association. Mortgage loans that were late or in foreclosure stood at 10.27% of all loans and totaled almost $1 trillion.

Alt-A Mortgage Loans

Alt-A mortgage loans are considered to be of a higher quality than subprime mortgage loans but not as high quality as a prime mortgage loan that would qualify for sale to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. They can share many structural qualities with subprime loans, but the pricing of Alt-A loans is generally somewhat more favorable to a borrower than that of a subprime loan.

Examples of a typical Alt-A borrower would be one who has an acceptable credit rating but may have trouble verifying income, employment, or assets.

Subprime Mortgage Payment Reset Concerns

The greatest concern regarding subprime mortgages is that the vast majority of them are adjustable rate loans that start out with low "teaser" interest rates or low â€œteaserâ€? monthly payment amounts that typically expire after the first year or two.
When this "teaser" period expires, the interest rate or payment amount can increase, often resulting in the subprime mortgage borrower being placed in the position of being unable to make the new monthly payments. The typical results are:

The subprime lender has to foreclose on the subprime mortgage, or
The subprime lender has to enter into a workout arrangement with the borrower which usually results in the subprime lender writing down the value of the loan on their books.

In either of these two possibilities, the subprime lender winds up with an investment value that is less than what was reflected on their books before the subprime loan went into default.

Subprime Car Loans

There are estimates that approximately $50 billion in subprime car loans were originated in 2006, the most recent year for which reliable information is available. This accounts for over 19% of all car loans originated during that period.

Subprime car loans include some features that make them as risky as subprime mortgage loans, and some features that make them less risky. For example, mortgage loans are secured by an asset that generally appreciates in value, whereas a car loan is secured by an asset that generally depreciates in value. On the other side of the ledger, mortgage loans are often repaid based upon a variable interest rate and variable payment amount; whereas car loans are more likely to be on a fixed rate and fixed payment amount.

Comparing subprime car loans to prime car loans, we find that subprime car loans are usually repaid over a longer term, require a lower down payment, and are made for a higher loan-to-value ratio than are prime car loans.

In the final analysis, it is believed that subprime car loans carry slightly less risk than do subprime mortgage loans since the retention of the car is often critical in order for the borrower to continue to work. Even so, there is always the possibility that the borrower could walk away from the car and subprime car loan and obtain transportation through another subprime car loan arrangement.

Subprime Credit Cards

Many of the issues of subprime mortgage lending apply as well to subprime credit cards. Today, about 20% of the credit cards issued in the United States are considered to be of subprime quality.

Today, the credit card industry divides customers into the "prime" and "subprime" markets. Borrowers with a credit score in the top tier (and these tiers vary from lender to lender and are adjusted from time to time) may receive a credit card with a line of credit at an interest rate around 12%. Borrowers with a slightly lower credit score may receive a credit card with a line of credit at an interest rate of 15%, and a borrower with an even lower credit score may receive a credit card with a credit line at an interest rate around 17%. These are all considered non-subprime credit card customers.

Interest rates on subprime credit cards can be anywhere in a range from 20% to as high as 35% or so, depending upon the credit history of the borrower. In addition, lenders charge various fees, such as an annual fee and an account maintenance fee, to help offset their increased risk.

Subprime credit card lending began in the 1990s to allow subprime lenders to provide credit cards to customers with less than perfect credit and profit from the higher interest rates and fees that subprime lenders charge for these credit cards. The subprime credit card industry's market goal was to provide a credit card with a line of credit to customers with credit scores in the 500s, little or no credit history, those coming out of a personal bankruptcy and anyone else with a recent history of credit or financial problems.

Subprime credit cards offered to subprime borrowers typically require no security deposit, as do secured credit cards. Credit limits start out very low compared to those in the non-subprime credit card industry, typically in the $100 to $500 credit limit range. Fees and interest rates are much higher than those for non-subprime credit cards. Likewise, the effect of some terms can be magnified due to the small credit line size. For example, take an overlimit fee of $29.00. This fee is of course a much greater percentage for a subprime credit card line of $500 than it would be for a non-subprime credit card of $5,000.

With these greater rewards for subprime credit card lenders come greater risks. It is reported that subprime credit card companies are writing off losses in the 15% to 17% range versus the average industry loss rate of 6.5%, according to CardWeb; and delinquency rates for subprime card companies average around 10% while those for the rest of the lending industry average around 5%.
Subprime credit card issuers use mass marketing techniques to bring in customers. Mail and Internet new account solicitations exceeded 5 billion in 2006, and were up dramatically from the total in 2005.

Secured Subprime Credit Cards

Those with the lowest credit scores and histories may still qualify for a secured subprime credit card. Essentially, even though a secured subprime credit card looks and, in terms of making purchases, acts like a regular credit card, it is basically a pre-paid card wherein the customer makes a "security deposit" to insure the payment of charges made with the secured subprime credit card.

Actually, the term "subprime" is typically not included in the term of art when discussing secured credit cards; but make no mistake about it, one only has to take a look at the terms of a secured credit card to see that it is a subprime credit card. Typical secured credit card terms include a hefty (in relation to the â€œcredit lineâ€?) annual fee and require a minimum deposit of from $99 up to $5,000 depending upon the size of the â€œcredit lineâ€? granted.

Despite their onerous terms, often a secured credit card is used as the first step for someone who needs to reestablish their credit.

Debit Cards

Debit cards carry the Visa or MasterCard name and give you the privilege of seeing money fly out of your checking account as soon as you make a purchase. In this way, a debit card is similar to a secured credit card except that the secured credit card essentially pays for purchases from the deposit you made earlier.
Managing a debit card that really does not offer you any credit, and coordinating all of the purchases that you make with your debit card with all of the checks that you write is a management nightmare.

Banks love debit cards because they eliminate the float that customers generally enjoy between the time a purchase is made and the time that the purchase has to be paid for, i.e., when you pay your credit card bill.

About the Author - Banking and Subprime Expert Witness Consultant Don Coker

Mr. Coker provides expert consultation, fact examination and analysis, advice, Affidavits, Declarations, reports, and sworn testimony at deposition and in court for plaintiffs and defendants engaged in litigation involving subprime mortgage lending, Alt-A mortgage lending, subprime car loans, subprime credit cards, and all areas of banking and finance.

Mr. Coker's expert witness experience and background includes over 400 cases for plaintiffs and defendants nationwide, over 100 testimonies, and 12 courthouse settlements in all areas of banking, finance, FACTA issues, real estate, economic damages, identity theft, business valuation, intangible asset valuation, and many related matters going back to 1989. Mr. Coker renders impartial opinions, and is privileged to be listed in the databases of recommended expert witness consultants of both the Defense Research Institute and the American Association of Justice.

His clients have included 8 of the top 10 banks in the country, 8 of the top 10 mortgage banking companies in the country, 12 of the world's 45 largest banks, 33 of the country's top 250 law firms, and numerous governmental clients including many banking regulators (FDIC, RTC, FSLIC, and others), IRS, USAID, U.S. Air Force, State of New York, State of Texas, World Bank, International Accounting Standards Board, and hundreds of others.

Mr. Coker's employment experience includes Citicorp and entities that are now JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, and Regions Financial, as well as Ford Motor Credit and a two-year stint as a high-level governmental financial institution regulator.

Mr. Coker holds a B.A. degree from the University of Alabama, and completed postgraduate and executive education at Alabama, the University of Houston, Southern Methodist University, Spring Hill College, and the Harvard Business School.

In addition to subprime mortgage and subprime credit card litigation consulting and other banking and finance-related litigation consulting, Mr. Coker provides consulting services in many additional areas including business valuations, business plan writing, feasibility studies, marketing studies, bank taxation matters, anti-money laundering policies and procedures, policy and procedure manuals for financial institutions and other businesses, merger and acquisition due diligence and assistance, research, and many other related areas.

As part of his wide-ranging consulting activities, Mr. Coker has been called on for many international engagements by clients in 27 countries for work assignments involving 56 countries. The World Bank sent Mr. Coker to Tanzania in to train governmental officials in various banking and business subjects, and also engaged him to write numerous addditional training programs. And the World Bank, USAID, and the International Accounting Standards Board Foundation sent Mr. Coker to Russia and Ukraine to interview top-level business officials to discuss and then evaluate a wide-ranging training program whose goal would be to educate and certify accounting professionals in International Financial Reporting Standards.

Mr. Coker is widely published on banking and financial subjects, and is often sought out by the media for interviews and comments.

Mr. Coker serves clients worldwide from his office in the metro Atlanta, Georgia USA area.

Telephone: (770) 852-2286 E-mail: Bankexpert@cs.com

Don Coker, Turnaround, Interim & Crisis Manager

Education:

College & University:

University of Alabama, BA.
University of Alabama, post graduate work.
University of Houston, post-graduate work.
Spring Hill College, masters degree-level work.
Southern Methodist University, executive education work.
Harvard Business School, Certificate in Business Valuation.

Professional Education:

American Bankers Association - American Institute of Banking: financial statement analysis, business finance, bank investments, principles of bank operations, bank management, trusts.
National Institute of Real Estate Boards, commercial real estate finance.
International Council of Shopping Centers, shopping center finance.
National Hospital Association, one-week workshop in healthcare entity finance and valuation.
Mortgage Bankers Association, workshops in multi-family and SFR lending.
Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas, training workshops on financial institution management, lending, investments, operations, et. al.
Texas Savings & Loan Department, training workshops on financial institution management, lending, investments, operations, et. al.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., real estate financing workshop.
First National Bank of Mobile, AL (later AmSouth, now Regions Financial), financial statement analysis, business finance, bank investments, credit card operations, deposit operations, bank management, trusts.
Gibraltar Savings Association (now Bank of America), commercial real estate finance, valuation, joint-ventures.
Citicorp, business, corporate, and real estate finance, valuation, deposit products, investments.
Southwest Bancshares (later Bank One, now JPMorgan Chase Bank), business finance and real estate investments.
Commercial Credit Corp. (now Citigroup), one-week Corporate Marketing Conference covering in-depth training in all financial products, plus 28 CDC Learning Center courses (equivalent to 45 semester hours) in business and economic subjects.
Xerox Corporation, Professional Selling Skills I and II.
Frost Bank, advanced credit analysis and business finance.

Don Coker's Representative Client List

Banking:

The World Bank
Citigroup/CitiFinancial
Bank of America
Bank of America - Canada
NationsBank
Bank One (now JPMorgan Chase Bank)
JPMorgan Securities, Inc.
Chase Home Loans, LLC (JPMorgan Chase)
Countrywide Financial Corp.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
Wachovia Bank
First Union Bank
Firstar/U.S. Bancorp
SouthTrust Bank
Washington Mutual Bank
Wells Fargo Bank
Wells Fargo Mortgage Corp.
National City (Bank) Corporation
MBNA America Bank
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania
Royal Bank of Scotland Group, plc
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital
Flagstar Bank, FSB
First National Bank of San Marcos, TX
Banco Industrial de Venezuela
Bank of Oklahoma
Southern Security Bank
First National Bank of Palm Beach
First Bank, Tallahassee, FL
Sunbelt Savings (now Bank of America)
Sunbelt Federal Bank
Bancomer, S.A. (Mexico)
Bluebonnet Savings
Standard Pacific Savings Bank
First National Bank of Brewton
Southeast Bank of Miami, FL
Barnett Banks, Inc.
Bank of the Southwest
Community National Bank, Midland, TX
Northshore Bank, TX
Bank of Bentonville, AR (Owned by Walton Family)
Priority Bancorp
PanAmerican Bank
KeyCorp
Iowa Trust
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Bilbao and Madrid, Spain)
Tanzania Institute of Bankers
Bank of Tanzania (central bank)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Goldome Realty Credit Corp.
Western Gulf Savings & Loan (now Wells Fargo)
American Savings & Loan
William E. Wood & Associates (Towne Bank, VA)
EDS - BEI Golembe Consultants

Governmental:

FDIC
Resolution Trust Corp.
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
Farm Credit Bank
U.S. Department of Education, Inspector General's Office
Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treasury Department
U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health
State of Texas, Savings & Loan Department (Regulators)
13 Municipalities in CA and CO
City of New Orleans
Tanzania Revenue Authority
United Nations Conference on Trade & Development
U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.; Kiev, Ukraine; Moscow, Russia)
U.S. Air Force (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) Judge Advocate General's Corps Office of Special Investigations
New York Governor George Pataki's Office of Regulatory Reform

Insurance:

AIG
CNA
St. Paul Travelers Insurance
Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Physicians Mutual and Physicians Life Insurance Companies
Employers Mutual Insurance Co.
Acadia Insurance Co.
Erie Insurance Group
State Farm Insurance Co.
Military Premium Managers
Reliance Insurance
International Transport Intermediaries Club, Ltd., UK
North River Insurance Co.
American Casualty Insurance Co.
National Union Fire Insurance Co.
Continental Casualty Insurance Co.
Lloyds of London, UK
Crum & Forster Managers
Xerox Financial Services
Thomas Miller & Company, UK

Corporate:

Ford Motor Credit Company
Cisco Systems
Microsoft
IBM - Lotus Development
Kawasaki
Toshiba
Intuit, Inc.
Wal-Mart Stores
Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust
Fraud Discovery Institute
Doral Mortgage Corp.
Ambassador Mortgage
Security Properties
McGladrey & Pullen, LLP (CPAs)
Prentice Hall Publishing
Central Financial Services
NAPA Auto Parts
Pioneer Financial Services
Sansbury Ace Hardware
Madison Equity Mortgage Co.
Darryl's Restaurants
Bosler & Hashioka Developers
Sears
Scorpion International Services, S.A., (Athens, Greece)
Heritage Motels. Inc.
Sunrise Gardens Apartments, Las Vegas, NV
Barron's Educational Software
Anco Merchandising
Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons International Association
Network Software Associates
Calco Aerospace
Midwest Merger Management
Education Central, Inc. (USVI)
Ruby Tuesday
Remington Investments
Inverelle, Inc.
Alpha Software
Phivos Karnaos (London & Moscow)
Simon & Schuster Publishing
The King Edward Inn (Canada)
Jancik Concrete Specialties
Keytronics
Concord Boat Corp.
NBI Software
Houlihan's Restaurants
Sprint/Nextel
Ukrainian Accounting Reform Project (Kiev, Ukraine)
International Accounting Standards Board Foundation (London)
Stanford Carr - Ewa Development Company (Hawai'i)
Royster-Clark Agribusiness
American Consolidated Credit
Specialty Motor Cars
George B. Kaiser, Forbes 400 List
ButtonWare Software (PC Calc+)
Fillette Green Shipping
Zapadnoe Koltze (Moscow, Russia)
Benchmarking Partners
Gary Tharaldson, Forbes 400 List
Boston Credit Corp.
Dr. Richard Dombroff
Morrison's Cafeterias
Transcontinental Products & Services
Reynolds Lumber Company
Broderbund Software
Marchese Chevrolet
Surgency
Westat
Computer Associates
AvtoVAZ (Russia's largest car company - LADA automobiles)
AutoVAZBank (Tagliatti, Russia)
Import Specialists
Timeworks Software
Fleming Electric Co.
WordStar
Christian Bay Shipping Company
Cliff's Notes Publishing
DataEase International
CreditCare Credit Counseling
AddStor Software
Olympic Cube
Kilimanjaro International (Africa)
Chemonics International
Tax Express Income Tax Services
Institute for Stock Market and Management (Moscow, Russia)

Countries for which Mr. Coker has provided to clients expertise in one form or another include, of course, the United States of America, plus Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, United Kingdom, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tanzania, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and many others.

Mr. Coker serves clients worldwide from his office in the northern metro Atlanta, Georgia USA area.

This website will be augmented as time permits. In the meantime, please refer to Mr. Coker's Curriculum Vitae which is incorporated into his Bank Consulting website which is linked below.

Some of the services offered include:

Business Ethics
Business Process Analysis
Interim CEO Specialist
Interim Chief Executive Officer
Change Management
Continuous Improvement
Corporate Governance
Decision Making
Interim Corporate Restructuring Specialist
Interim Crisis Manager
Financial Ethics
Interim Financial Restructuring Specialist
Interim General Manager
Interim Manager
Interim Liquidation Manager
Liquidation Plan
Interim Liquidation Specialist
Interim Loan Workout Consultant
Office Start-up Costs and Assistance
Interim Project Manager
Interim Restructuring Manager
Interim Restructuring Specialist
Pareto Analysis
Root Cause Analysis
Short-Term Manager
Temporary Manager
Transitional Manager
Troubled Debt Restructuring
Turnaround General Manager
Turnaround Manager
Turnaround CEO
Turnaround Plan
Turnaround Specialist
Wind-down Manager
Workout Expert
Workout Specialist

Related Links

Knowledgeable in the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, including:

• Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 – Signing and certification of financial statements.

• Sarbanes-Oxley Section 401 – Financial statement accuracy and off balance sheet liabilities.

• Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 – Internal controls and procedures.

• Sarbanes-Oxley Section 409 – Material changes in financial condition and operations.

• Sarbanes-Oxley Section 802 – Accuracy of records and record retention.

Knowledgeable in the valuation of businesses, business units, tangible assets, intangible assets, patents and other intellectual property assets.

Knowledgeable in all areas of corporate finance.

Knowledgeable in net present value, discounted cash flow, and all other important financial and valuation calculation methodologies.

Knowledgeable in financial workouts and organizational restructuring.

Former Board of Directors Executive Committee member.

Former Board of Directors Loan Committee member.

Former Board of Directors Audit Committee member.

Former Board of Directors Pension Plan Trustee.

Former officer of various subsidiary corporations.

Former governmental banking regulator.

Consultant to governmental banking regulators.

Consultant to many major corporations and over sixty banks.

Ability to cut through irrelevant extraneous material and get to the gravamen of a problem or situation.

Superb communications skills.

Widely published.

Unquestioned ethics and the discipline to speak up when necessary in order to insure compliance with the highest ethical standards.

Ability to travel to any location nationwide for engagements.

Articles by Don Coker

Business Start-up Advice and Services

Advice and services provided for start up businesses and paid for by the issuance of stock in the startup business will be considered on a case by case basis.

Services that can be provided include:

• Business plan preparation.

• Start-up cost estimate.

• Feasibility and market studies.

• Financial structuring and planning.

• Financial projections.

• Site location.

• Merger and acquisition analysis.

• Expansion analysis and planning.

• International activities.

• Management structure planning.

• Cost cutting programs and analysis.

• Management consulting.

Click on this link to read: "Check Scam Fundamental Considerations"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6673

Click on this link to read: "Fraud and Litigation Involving Real Estate Closings, Closing Protection Letters, and Title Insurance Industry Standard Practices and Procedures"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6632

Click on this link to read: "What Went Wrong at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and How to Resurrect Them"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7595

Click on this link to read: "Toxic Bank Asset Valuation Principles"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7168

Click on this link to read: "Mortgage Loan Servicing Industry Standard Practices and Procedures to Consider When Defending Wrongful Foreclosure Cases"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7148

Click on this link to read: "Bernie Madoff is a Bad, Bad Man"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7146

Click on this link to read: "A Primer on Intellectual Property and Intangible Asset Royalty Rates"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7145

Click on this link to read: "Mortgage Banking and Loan Servicing Industry Standard Practices and Procedures for Force Placed Insurance"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6939

Click on this link to read: "Troubled Bank Management 101: A Detailed Analysis of an FDIC Cease and Desist Order"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6819

Click on this link to read: "How Private Equity Firms Can Profitably Invest in Troubled Banks"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6787

Click on this link to read: "A Banker's Guide to Effectively Managing and Marketing Bank Owned Foreclosed Real Estate Properties"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6668

Click on this link to read: "The Wacky World of Interim Management"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6667

Click on this link to read: "Subprime Lending Fundamentals"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6666

Click on this link to read: "Credit Card Expiration Dates and FACTA"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6665

Click on this link to read: "Business Valuation Fundamentals"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6656

Click on this link to read: "Managing Troubled and Failed Banks for Maximum Advantage"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6655

Click on this link to read: "A Primer on Intellectual Property Valuation"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6603

Click on this link to read: "The Facts on the FACTA Clarification Act"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6599

Click on this link to Read: "Mortgage Banking and Mortgage Loan Servicing Industry Standard Practices and Procedures"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7232

Click on this link to read: "Considerations in Defending Banking and Financial Class Action Lawsuits"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7242

Click on this link to read: "Defending FDCPA and FCRA Litigation on Purchased Delinquent Debt"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7438

Click on this link to read: "Defending State Attorneys General Class Action Lawsuits"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7593

Click on this link to read: "Construction Lending Industry Standard Practices Applicable to Construction Lending Litigation"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=18115

Click on this link to read: "Inspections and Broker Price Opinion Industry Standard Practices for the Mortgage Industry"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=18102

Click on this link to read: "Litigation Involving Bank Trust Departments, Wealth and Investment Management Nationwide Industry Standards"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7647

Click on this link to read: "Bank Security Principles and Issues"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=7655

Don Coker

Bankexpert@cs.com

(770) 852-2286.

By Don Coker

About the Author

Don Coker

Economic Damages

Credit damage estimates
Intellectual property damages
Patent damages
Real estate damages
Research on economic damages
Advice on economic damages issues
Class action economic damages issues
Anti-trust economic damages issues
Credit bureau issues
Proximate cause of economic damages
Subprime lending issues

How Private Equity Firms Can Profitably Invest in Troubled Banks, By Bank Management Professional Don Coker

Private Equity firms can profitably invest in banks by injecting reasonable capital, engaging experienced, professional bank management, and prudently investing the bank’s funds in loans and other investments that make economic sense.

News Bulletin: The old banking model still works, if given a chance.

It is quite encouraging that I recently have received numerous calls from Private Equity (“PE”) firms and other investors wanting to buy troubled banks, and seeking either my advice on how to profitably run them, or wanting to hire me to run one for them the way that a bank should be run. In fact, considering what banking has been through in the last couple of years, it’s down right refreshing!

How is it that these people who only a short time ago were relying on alchemistic derivatives schemes and others that purport to guarantee that no one ever loses are now getting some of that old time religion? Thank God for pendulums that swing and for cycles.

Running and restructuring troubled banks is a tough business, and I have been on the front lines several times, primarily hired by the banking regulators as a consultant and “army of one” to run insolvent banks and their wholly-owned mortgage banking companies.

At this point, allow me to recite for you verbatim the entire set of instructions that I was given by a much-older-than-me governmental banking regulatory deputy commissioner immediately prior to my first assignment as a governmental banking Regulatory Supervisory Agent during the mid-1980s-mid-1990s banking meltdown. As we stood in the parking lot of the insolvent bank, he put his arm around my shoulder in a fatherly way and said, “Son, go in there and run that son of a 'gun' the way a bank should be run.” (Please notice that I have taken artistic license to clean up his language.)

And the funny thing was, I knew exactly what he meant! I knew how to run a bank, and he knew that I knew how to run a bank. No further instructions were needed. So I went in there and ran it the way that it should be run. After extensive organizational restructuring, financial restructuring, product realignment, staff adjustments, and many other required corrections, the result was that the bank was cleaned up to the point that it was merged into Norwest which soon became Wells Fargo. Not a bad outcome for an insolvent bank.

However, I must mention that there is another factor that has to be considered in a situation like this, and that is the old saying: “When one enters a chess game after the twelfth move, one makes the thirteenth move.”

Accordingly, you do not walk into an insolvent or troubled bank and simply sit down and start profitably banking without first dealing with some highly unusual factors. For example:

• Immediately (assuming you did not do so before accepting the job) examine all regulatory restrictions under which the bank is operating, and make sure that you are in compliance.

• Next, “Job One” is to stop the bleeding immediately. Look for and plug any expense leaks, revenue leaks, and any sources that are producing red ink. This is a major job, and not nearly as obvious and easy as you might think. You will find situations within the bank that everyone there assumes are SOP and okay, and many of them are just flat wrong. Ferreting out these problems is a good way to show the banking regulators that you have a handle on things, and that you are turning things around; and it gives them another reason to leave you alone and to go take down the next guy who is not dealing with his problems.

• Do a profitability analysis on every transactional product in the bank, such as all deposit account types, and all loan types. Dump anything that is unprofitable, even if it means reducing deposits or assets. Recognize that customers come and go and that it is stupid to take a loss on a product in order to “gain a customer” when the new customer will immediately jump ship as soon as your competitor offers him a ¼% more in interest on his CD or ¼% less in interest on his loan.

• Jump into the foreclosed properties and those in more serious stages of delinquency, and take corrective actions. Make sure that energetic marketing plans are underway for all properties of all types owned by the bank.

• Determine which officers and employees can help you and which ones are working against you. Impress upon all officers and employees that your success helps the chances of the continuation of the existence of the bank, and concomitantly, their jobs. If some continue to work against you, boot them out.

• Do a periodic GL scrub where you look at every item going in and out. You will be surprised how quickly you can identify problems that are obvious to you but commonly accepted by the bank’s staff.

• Require complete breakdowns on numbers that appear on financial statements. For example, break down the “Real Estate” heading and see if there are any surplus properties. Look at the “Miscellaneous Assets” as well. (Note: Once while doing this, I discovered a hunting lodge that the staff had been hiding from me.)

• Ask questions AND GET ANSWERS. Do not accept throwaway answers, incomplete answers, or answers that dodge the question. In a troubled financial institution (or corporate) situation, you do not have the luxury of allowing your officers and employees to play games with you. You will probably have to pare down some staff anyway, so start with these non-answerers.

Here are some simple Rules that will help you avoid many of the problems that bank managers have encountered recently:

1. Don’t originate stupid loans. Use your head. Make sure you actually have an excess of collateral value over your proposed loan amount, and make sure that the borrower has the income (now) to make the loan payments.

2. Don’t originate a loan that you would not want to retain in your own portfolio. Be a gatekeeper for the financial system, and make sure that only decent quality loans enter it.

3. Don’t make loans for the wrong reasons, such as: The borrower is financially irresponsible, but he is a relative, neighbor, buddy, golf buddy, lunch buddy, club buddy, hunting buddy, fishing buddy, church buddy, been in town a hundred years, etc.

4. Don’t extend an irresponsible borrower’s loan just because he is a relative, neighbor, buddy, golf buddy, lunch buddy, club buddy, hunting buddy, fishing buddy, church buddy, been in town a hundred years, etc.

5. Don’t hire someone just because he is a relative, neighbor, buddy, golf buddy, lunch buddy, club buddy, hunting buddy, fishing buddy, church buddy, been in town a hundred years, etc.

6. Make sure that you have a healthy spread (at least 3% minimum and hopefully more) between your cost of funds and your interest rates on your loans. (Note: I once worked for a CEO that believed in paying savers 13.5% interest and lending that money out at 8.5%, and people thought he was a genius. I thought he was an idiot. Soon afterwards, he was out of banking.)

The Question of Allowing Private Equity Firms to Buy Banks

Private equity firms have very astutely recognized the potential profits to be realized from acquiring and rehabilitating troubled banks in today’s economy. Every time one of these financial system meltdowns occurs, the handwringers declare that banks are toast and will not survive to be a significant part of the economy in the future. And every time, the handwringers have been wrong. Banks are essential to our economy; and if you look around the world, you will see that every strong economy has strong banks, and every weak economy has weak banks, or virtually no banks at all. Banks in the United States of America will survive and will thrive in our soon-to-be-rejuvenated economy,

It is my opinion that PE firms can inject significant capital funds that will make a positive contribution towards resolving many of the problems in banking today. Even today, there is apparently an incredibly large pool of funds available to be tapped for investment in, among other things, the acquisition of banks. (Don’t take my word for it on the large pool of funds, just ask Bernie Madoff.)

It is also my opinion that the banking regulators are justified in having some concerns about bank owners who have no experience at managing banks. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that it is erroneous for the banking regulators to place unrealistic capital, future funding, and cross-guarantee requirements on PE firms that acquire banks. Enacting these stringent requirements will certainly scare off a potential significant source of capital funds that can be used to recapitalize troubled banking institutions. Furthermore, enacting unreasonable requirements on PE firms that purchase banks is like punishing the guy that closes the corral gate rather than the one who opened it in the first place. Certainly there is some middle-ground position that will be acceptable to the PE firms and the banking regulators.

Having been through the previous banking meltdown in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, it is my opinion that the banking regulators should welcome the entry of PE firms into the ownership and recapitalization of banks; but the banking regulators should make sure that the decision makers and the top management of each bank are not investment bankers and financial alchemists but rather are truly knowledgeable bankers that know how to run a bank the way a bank should be run. Increased capital, from PE firms and other sources, and competent management will be major steps toward the restoration of the health of our country’s banking system.

About the Author – Banking Management Professional & Consultant Don Coker

Don Coker is a heavily experienced financial institution management professional and former high-level governmental banking regulator who was previously chosen by the banking regulators to serve as an interim manager, banking management and operational troubleshooter, and in regulatory oversight positions. Based upon extensive experience and achievements in banking and lending at Citicorp and entities that are now Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Regions Financial, he was chosen to serve as the on-site supervisory regulatory agent interim manager for two insolvent financial institutions and two bank-owned mortgage banking institutions. Duties included the hands-on management of $1.8 billion (2009 USD) in assets including over $600 million in troubled assets, and participation in the review, restructuring, and recommendation of various recapitalization and merger plans. Mr. Coker also was called upon by the governmental banking regulators to serve in regulatory oversight positions for various insolvent institutions under the supervision of the banking regulators. In addition, Mr. Coker has been called on numerous times by the governmental banking regulators as well as the IRS to serve as their expert witness consultant in various significant banking litigation matters including one matter that exceeded $26 billion in value (2009 USD).

Mr. Coker is active in litigation consulting, serving as an expert witness consultant in over 400 cases nationwide since 1989, and has testified over 100 times. He has been engaged by hundreds of law firms including 33 of the country’s top 250. In addition, he has been engaged by 8 of the country’s top 10 banks, over 60 banks worldwide including 12 of the world’s top 45 banks, and 8 of the country’s top 10 mortgage banking companies.

In addition to litigation-related work, Mr. Coker is active in performing business valuations, IP valuations, core deposit valuations, intangible asset valuations, feasibility studies, commercial real estate studies, marketing studies, business plans, anti-money laundering consulting, and advising investment funds on banking matters.

Mr. Coker’s work has involved clients in 27 countries and work covering 56 countries. He serves clients worldwide from his office in the northern metropolitan Atlanta area, and can be reached at:

Bankexpert@cs.com

(770) 852-2286.

http://expertwitness.lawinfo.com/expert/Bankexpert/

http://expertwitness.lawinfo.com/expert/Interim/

Don Coker offers Interim CEO Management, Interim Chairman of the Board Management, Interim Turnaround Management, Interim Restructuring Management, Interim Workout Management, Interim Subprime Mortgage Loan Workout and Restructuring Management, Interim Bank CEO Manager, Interim Project Management, Interim Transitional Management, and other Temporary Management services nationwide and worldwide.

Interim management positions considered include Interim manager, interim CEO, interim Chairman, subprime mortgage restructuring manager, interim banking CEO turnaround manager, bank manager, bank turnaround manager, interim bank restructuring manager, interim bank financial restructuring manager, interim bank CEO manager, interim bank strategic financial planning and restructuriing manager, corporate CEO turnaround manager, crisis manager, interim transition manager, temporary CEO, temporary manager, financial specialist, restructuring expert, director, workout expert, mortgage banking expert, interim turnaround CEO, interim financial restructuring expert, liquidation management, troubled debt restructuring, subprime mortgage expert, real estate mortgage restructuring, interim turnaround management consultant, and interim turnaround manager.

Don Coker also has a great deal of successful experience in managing troubled mortgage and corporate debt portfolios as well as portfolios of foreclosed properties. His past responsibilities include the management and disposition of over 100 troubled and foreclosed commercial real estate properties (REO = Real Estate Owned; and OREO = Other Real Estate Owned) scattered from coast to coast but mostly concentrated in Texas. This portfolio was valued at approximately $675,000,000 in 2009 USD.

Mr. Coker won high praise from the banking regulators for his success in dealing with this large portfolio of troubled commercial and residential real estate loans and foreclosed properties.

Click on this link to read: "Managing Troubled and Failed Banks for Maximum Advantage"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6655

Click on this link to read: "A Guide to Effectively Managing and Marketing Bank Owned Foreclosed Real Estate Properties"

http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=6668

Visit: http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=7232

Additional Questions or need further information?

Don Coker

423 Latimer Street

Woodstock, GA 30188-5052

Phone: 770-852-2286

Fax: 509-678-7756

Additional Faxes: (610) 643-7870 or (419) 517-5284

Entire Website Contents Copyrighted 2008 by Don Coker

Remember, the more information you provide, the easier it is for us to help you.

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The information contained in this web site is intended to convey general information. It should not be construed as legal advice or opinion. It is not an offer to represent you, nor is it intended to create an attorney-client relationship.

Don Coker

Call: 770-852-2286

Interim CEO Management Services

Interim CEO / Chairman also Offering Temporary, Transitional, Turnaround, Crisis, Project, Corporate Restructuring, Subprime, Workout and Expert Witness Services

Remember, the more information you provide, the easier it is for us to help you.